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11 Introduction
In standard majority rule problems of redistribution, individuals with income below the median gain
from redistribution while those above lose. This splits the population into two opposing halves, making
the voter with median-income decisive. There are, however, a number of well-known extensions of such
problems where this con￿ ict between the rich and the poor is not necessarily sustained. If, for example, a
poor individual must reach some minimum level of income to bene￿t from redistribution, he may dislike
small tax increases at low levels, but favour them given that the level is su¢ ciently high. This, in turn,
a⁄ects individual preferences in such a way that they are not necessarily single-peaked, nor single-crossing,
which in turn may a⁄ect the possibility to evoke any of the median-voter theorems.1
A classic situation of this kind is voting over school subsidies. For low levels of taxation, subsidies
may not be su¢ cient to enable the poorest to attend school and, hence, they do not gain anything from
the system. This means that they may oppose a higher tax rate in coalition with the rich. However,
if taxes increase and transfers become larger, education becomes accessible for the poor and they now
change their attitude to further tax increases. In a situation where everyone attends school and hence
gets the subsidy, the political con￿ ict returns to the standard rich-against-the-poor outcome.
In this paper, we revisit the problem of voting over education subsidies using a new approach. We
develop a method which allows us to study the problem regardless of the applicability of the median-voter
theorems. This is, of course, desirable in itself but it also turns out that the method enables us to gain a
number of new insights. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that a typical situation has multiple local equilibria; one with
zero taxes and no subsidies; one with low taxes, a large number of individuals still outside the schooling
system and many in private schooling; and yet another one with high taxes, everyone in schooling, and
few choosing the private alternative.
Clearly, only one of these outcomes can be the Condorcet winner, and usually (though not always)
this turns out to be the high tax equilibrium. However, when introducing small changes to the standard
1The distinction referred to is, of course, that between the two versions of the median voter theorem; one restricting
preferences to being single-peaked (based on Black, 1948 and Downs, 1957), the other restricting the preference ordering
(variously stated in Roberts,1977, Grandmont, 1978, Rothstein, 1990 and 1991, and uni￿ed in Gans and Smart, 1996). See
Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for overviews. In problems of the type studied here both
versions can fail to hold and even though one can extend the number of situations for which we can guaratee equilibria by
using both versions of the theorem, it does typically not cover all relevant situations.
2political game, such as costs associated with altering the incumbent policy (borne either by the candidates
or the electorate), each local equilibrium may actually become the stable outcome. As we will show, the
local equilibria usually do not only defeat neighbouring policies, but often a broad range of policies
around itself. We refer to such a range of policies as a stability region. If an economy starts out in a
local equilibrium, the relationship between costs of changing policy and the size of the stability region,
determines whether change will occur or not. Consequently, two otherwise identical economies could
exhibit very di⁄erent transfer systems as a result of di⁄erent initial policies. Furthermore, the only way
to shift from a local equilibrium to another is by a "jump" in policy, while gradual change typically is
not possible. Our method allows for the evaluation of exactly how small (or large) perturbations of the
existing situation that are needed for political change to take place.
Under realistic assumptions, we ￿nd the low tax equilibrium to have a very broad stability region -
defeating all tax rates between zero and 68 percent. Hence, relatively small costs are su¢ cient to make it
the stable outcome in a majority vote, even though the high tax-transfer state is the Condorcet-winner
policy. The stability regions, as well as political coalitions ￿nally, change in economically intuitive ways
with the parameters.
The awareness of potential problems with majority rule equilibrium in standard redistributive situa-
tions go back to classics such as Bowen (1944) and Musgrave (1959, Chapter 6).2 One partial solution
to the potential problem of non-existence of voting equilibria in these cases, is to note that when the
problem is one dimensional there will, under very general assumptions, at least be local equilibria.3 This
was discussed in the context of schooling by Stiglitz (1974) and used by Klevorick and Kramer (1973)
in a study of social choice on pollution management. However, in their classic textbook Public Eco-
nomics, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) deemed the local equilibrium concept unsatisfactory. As they put
it: "whether it provides a persuasive resolution to the "majority-voting paradox" depends on the extent
to which choices are limited to small perturbations of the existing situation" (p. 307).
2Bowen (1944) is particularly interesting as this is an early recognition of the fact that education is an example of a social
good which is not equally bene￿cial to everyone. He also points out the di⁄erence between voting over preferred levels of
public goods and "voting on increments to existing outputs". Again he points to schooling as an example where individuals
typically vote "not on how much of the good they prefer, but rather on whether or not they wish a given increment of
decrement to the quantity already provided" (p.40). Finally Bowen also mentions the potential problems with strategic
voting (though he does not use the term).
3E.g. Theorem 2 in Klevorick and Kramer (1973). See also Kats and Nitzan (1977) on the relations between global and
local equilibria.
3Ever since, the typical way of dealing with this kind of problem has been to focus on cases where some
version of the median voter theorem applies. Examples are Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Perotti (1993),
Epple and Romano (1996a) and (1996b), Gouveia (1997), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and others.4
An exception is Fernadez and Rogerson (1995), who solve the problem by introducing restrictions on the
underlying distribution of the voters.5
All of the articles above, only consider policies which defeat all other alternatives (i.e. the Condorcet
winner), while the possibility of local equilibria - or something in between local and global equilibria -
have not been considered.6 In this paper, we argue that minor (and plausible) changes of the standard
game, in many cases can be su¢ cient to make the previously discarded local equilibrium concept relevant
as a stable equilibrium outcome, even though agents are not myopic. Finally, the method we present in
this paper is general is applicable to many one-dimensional majority voting problem where the median
voter theorems do not apply.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we apply the method to a problem
of majority rule decisions over school subsidies where credit constraints for investing in education can be
binding, and where public and private schooling coexist. In Section 3 we de￿ne relevant political equilibria
(in particular global and local equilibria) and the versions of majority rule competition discussed above.
In Section 4 we solve the problem and show how the outcome varies with the parameters of the problem.
In particular we show how the stability regions around local equilibria change with the costs of schooling
and the initial distribution of income. In Section 5 we discuss some more general insights that can be
drawn from our example and, ￿nally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
4Typically, these articles give conditions for when the median voter theorem applies and, in some of them, the equilibrium
(if it exists) is characterized for the cases when the theorem does not apply. However, this is not to say that they have only
looked at cases where preferences are single-peaked. There are cases where the median voter theorem holds even though
preferences are not single-peaked (as in Glomm and Ravikumar 1998) and there are cases where there is majority voting
equilibrium but the median (income earner) is not decisive (as in Epple and Romano 1996a). Both single-peakedness and
order restriction are su¢ cient, not necessary, conditions for a majority voting equilibrium.
5The list in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) has 25 di⁄erent cases and, as they point out, this list would become longer
if they had more than three income groups (footnote 17, p. 257).
6Local equilibria have been considered in articles on other related topics. Examples of such articles are Al￿s-Ferrer and
Ania (2001) and CrØmer and Palfrey (2002).
42 A simple model of educational choice
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals who di⁄er in initial income yi. The distribution of
income is given by a cummulative distribution function, F (y), with a corresponding probability density
function denoted f (y). The function f (y) is assumed to be continuous and positive over it￿ s support




is equal to average income.
Individuals are assumed to live for two periods. For simplicity utility is linear in income and there
is no discounting between periods.7 In the ￿rst period each individual has to decide whether to invest
in public, private or no schooling. Investing in public schooling has the ￿xed cost E, whereas investing
in private schooling has the ￿xed cost P, with P > E > 0.8 The return to schooling is realized in the
second period, and given by g(yi), and h(yi) for public and private schooling respectively. Those who
do not attend school get the same income as in the ￿rst period, yi: Furthermore, it is assumed that
h(yi) ￿ P > g(yi) ￿ E > yi for all i, which implies that all individuals prefer private education to public
education, and that all individuals prefer public education to no education.9 However, in the absence of
perfect credit markets (and without special government intervention) individuals would sort into three
groups depending on whether they can a⁄ord private schooling, public schooling, or no schooling at all.10
To enable schooling for a larger share of the population a uniform tax, ￿ 2 [0;1); chosen in a majority
rule election, is raised to subsidize public education. Speci￿cally, we assume that agents who choose public
schooling get a subsidy, s(￿), while those who choose no schooling and private schooling respectively get
no subsidy.11
Given initial income, individual utility (over both periods) is given by
7These simpli￿cations are not in anyway necessary for the application of our method. It is straight forward to use it
with any well-behaved utility function. We only choose the simplest possible setting for expositional purposes.
8These costs can be thought of as timecosts, foregone income or acctual schooling fees or some combination of these.
We assume that the costs can be treated as one ￿xed, lump-sum cost.
9Discounting can be thought of as included in the payo⁄ functions.
10Note that what we call "absence of government intervention" does not imply that there is no government, and in
particular it does not imply the absence of public schooling. It should only be taken to mean that at this point there is no
speci￿c subsidy to those attending the public school.
11We could generalize this to a situation where individuals who choose private school get at least a fraction ￿s(t);￿ 2
[0;1]:To simplify the exposition of our method and avoid carrying a number of possible cases throughout the analysis we
simplify the setting to one where ￿ = 0:
5ui =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(1 ￿ ￿)yi + yi if no schooling
(1 ￿ ￿)yi + s(￿) ￿ E + g(yi) if public schooling
(1 ￿ ￿)yi ￿ P + h(yi) if private schooling
(1)
Assuming that the ordinal relationship between the di⁄erent choices is not a⁄ected by the subsidy,
i.e. that, h(yi) ￿ P > g(yi) ￿ E + s(￿) > yi for all i and all ￿; the population will split into three groups





0 if E ￿ s
E￿s(￿)
1￿￿ if E > s
; (2)





in which case he choses private schooling.




f (y)dy = 1 ￿ F (y￿￿ (t));





f (y)dy = F(y￿￿(t)) ￿ F(y￿(t));
the share unable to a⁄ord schooling is given by 1 ￿ Npub ￿ Npriv. The size of the subsidy s(￿), which
goes only to those in public school, depends on the tax rate ￿, but also on the number of individuals
optimally choosing public schooling. Assuming a balanced budget
12The case which we assume away is the possibility that there are those who could pay for the private education with the
higher return, but who would abstain from this so as to get the subsidy in period one. This can happen in general but, as
we will con￿rm, does not happen for any relevant cases in our example. It would also be possible to solve the model with











(or zero if no one chooses public schooling). This implicit function can be shown to have a ￿x-point (the
proof has been placed below in connection to where we solve the model and ￿nd the equilibria).
Given the critical income levels above, we can de￿ne the utility function in terms of these threshold
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> > > > > > :
￿yi if yi < y￿
￿yi + s0 (￿) if y￿ ￿ yi ￿ y￿￿
￿yi if yi ￿ y￿￿
(5)
The interpretation of these expressions are straightforward: Individuals who cannot a⁄ord the invest-
ment despite the subsidy, would oppose a marginal increases in the tax rate, since this will only lead to
an increase of their tax payment (￿yi). The same is true for those who chose the private alternative since
they also pay taxes and get nothing in return. Those who chose public schooling, on the other hand, also
experience an increase in their tax burden, but at the same time they get an increased subsidy (as long
as s0 (￿) > 0).13 Within this group, the preference toward a marginal increase therefore clearly depends
on the relative size of the increase of the subsidy compared to the increased individual tax burden. Given
the obvious monotonicity of this relation, the share of the population in favour of a marginal increase at ￿
would be those with income yi 2 (y￿; b y); where b y is the income of an indi⁄erent agent given by b y = s0(￿);
given that b y 2 (y￿;y￿￿).14
The above does not say anything about individual preferences over (all) tax rates. It is simply a
description of how the population would be split into di⁄erent groups in favor of, or opposed to, a
marginal change of the tax rate (at any tax rate). Nevertheless, this way of describing the marginal (or
local) preferences of the population is, as we will show below, useful when studying how the population
is divided in their views of di⁄erent tax rates and in ￿nding local as well as global political equilibria.
13Obviously, if s0 (t) < 0, no one is in favor of a marginal increase of the tax rate.
14We can disregard the weight of those who shift between groups (i.e. shift from not being able to a⁄ord schooling, to
investing in public school, or shift between public and private school) as their weight goes to zero for an in￿nitesimally
small change of the tax rate. We will discuss this in more detail below.
72.1 Majority rule over educational subsidies
Given the individual alternatives described above, what level of taxation would be chosen in a majority
rule election? What would be the political equilibrium? The answer to this depends on the exact political
game. We will consider four variations of standard Downsian competition below. There are however some
things we can note without specifying the precise rules of political competition. First, the shifts in how
an individual evaluates a marginal change of the tax rate (depending on her choice of education) clearly
illustrates why there may be problems with applying either version of the median voter theorems.15
The failure to satisfy single peaked preferences over tax rates is easily illustrated. As taxes increase
an individual who is too poor to make the investment will only pay increasing taxes with decreasing
utility as a consequence. At some point, however, the size of the subsidy can be large enough to enable
the poor individual to make the investment leading utility to (possibly) increase. Figure 1a shows an
individual with an initial income (endowment) y < y￿ for all ￿ < ￿0: At ￿0 the subsidy becomes just
large enough for (1 ￿ ￿0)y + s(￿0) = E which allows the individual with initial income y to invest and
(under a certain subsidy function) experience increasing utility for higher tax rates. Similarily we can
illustrate how individual indi⁄erence curves (in the tax-subsidy space) can be non-single crossing. Figure
1b illustrates the fact that an individual who at tax rate ￿ requires at least s(￿) to make the investment
has an indi⁄erence curve which crosses the indi⁄erence curve of a richer person, who invests regardless of
the subsidy, twice. The fact that preferences are not necessarily single peaked nor single crossing means
that none of the median voter theorems can be applied in general.16
Even though the requirements for applying the MVTs do not hold, there is, as noted above, no
ambiguity in terms of how individuals evaluate marginal changes of the tax rate. This means that for
any tax rate ￿; we can aggregate the shares of the population into the total support for and against any
marginal change in the tax rate ￿ ￿￿. Furthermore, we can de￿ne a tax rate as a local equilibrium if it is
15As mentioned in the introduction, one may distinguish between the theorem relying on preferences being single peaked
and the theorem which requires single crossing (shown to be equivalent to order-restriction in Gans and Smart, 1996).
16The exact form of the utility function, as well as the indi⁄erence curves, of course depend on how subsidies evolve over
tax rates. For violation of single-peaked preferences to occur in this type of setting, what is needed is that there be some
segment of the policy where the poor person has decreasing utility from increasing the subsidy because they do not (can not)
participate, and that in some other segment where they do participate, they gain from redistribution. For single-crossing
to be violated what is needed is that poor individuals, who normally have indi⁄erence curves with a smaller slope than
richer once (as they require smaller subsidies to be indi⁄erent to a certain tax increase), for low enough tax rates can not
participate in the redistributive system and, hence have vertical indi⁄erence curves at this point.
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Figure 1: Illustration of failure to satisfy conditions for the Median Voter Theorems.
majority preferred to its￿neighboring tax rates ￿ ￿￿ (in the case of the possible corner solutions only one
neighboring point is relevant, with an obvious corresponding de￿nition).17 We now make the following
observations regarding local equilibrium outcomes and their relationship to global equilibrium outcomes
(i.e. the Condorcet winner, if it exists):
Lemma 1 For a tax rate to be a global equilibrium it must also be a local equilibrium (while the reverse
is obviously not true).
Lemma 2 If a local equilibrium tax rate also defeats all other tax rates, then this local equilibrium is also
a global equilibrium.
Lemma 3 If no local equilibrium tax rate is majority preferred to all other tax rates, then there exists
no global equilibrium.
As we can construct a function for the aggregate support for a marginal increase over the whole policy
space (the relevant space here being the one dimensional set of alternatives ￿ 2 [0;1)) we can use this
information to determine in which direction a majority would like to push the tax rate at any point (given
17See Kramer and Klevorick (1973) and (1974), Kats and Nitzan (1976), or more recently Al￿s-Ferrer and Ania (2001) or
CrØmer and Palfrey (2001) for more rigorous de￿nitions of local equilibrium in majority rule games. As shown by Kramer
and Klevorick (1973) a local equilibrium will exist in one dimensional settings under very general circumstances.
9that we only consider marginal changes).18 This is of course not su¢ cient to solve the problem but it
does provide a very useful starting point due to the following simple fact: If there is a majority in favour
of a marginal change of the tax rate, such a policy is not even a local equilibrium and consequently it
can not be a global equilibrium. Put di⁄erently, it su¢ ces to consider local equilibria when searching for
a global one.19 In the problem above, the fraction of the population that favours an increase of the tax





0 if b y < y￿
Z b y
y￿
f(y)dy if b y 2 (y￿;y￿￿)




y￿ (￿) = y￿ (￿ + ￿) (6)
lim
￿!0
b y (￿) = b y (￿ + ￿)
lim
￿!0
y￿￿ (￿) = y￿￿ (￿ + ￿) (7)
which in turn depends on the properties of s(￿). The limit for investing in private schooling is given
by y￿￿ = P
1￿￿ and is obviously contious in ￿: The critical income for investing in public schooling, y￿(￿)
is given by (2) above and the continuity of this depends on the continuity of s(￿); and as b y (￿) = s0(￿) we
must also show that the function s(￿) is continously di⁄erentiable for all critical incomes to be continous
in the tax rate. Using the implicit function theorem we can show that s(￿) exists and is a continously
di⁄erentiable function with a unique solution for every ￿.







￿ ￿Y = 0 there exists a
unique continously di⁄erentiable function s which has a solution for every ￿: Consider the continously
18Clearly we could just as well focus on the group in favor of a marginal decrease, which is just the complement of those
in favor of a marginal increase. (Also, considering tax rates smaller than unity is just for convenience so as to avoid carrying
the additional notation for cases when ￿ = 1 would create conditions where terms are unde￿ned due to division by zero).
19Note that this is not saying that it is enough to compare local equilibria (if there are more than one) as it may well be
the case that a local equilibrium tax rate is defeted by some other tax rate which is not itself even a local equilibrium. It
does however say that for a tax rate to be a global equilibrium it must also be a localequilibrium (as noted in Lemma 3).



























which is always positive (for the relevant domains of x;￿ and E and given the functions F and f) and
hence is a bijection. By the implicit function theorem we then know that there exists a neighborhood of
￿ and a unique continously di⁄erentiable function s such that s(￿o) = xo and ￿(s(￿);￿) = 0 8￿:
3 Solving the Model
To explicitly solve the model we need to choose values for the parameters (such as the schooling costs)
and the initial income distribution. We do not set out to calibrate the model to any speci￿c country
or situation, but instead chose reasonable values to illustrate a possible outcome, and then study how
the equilibria move with the parameters. Below we analyse which policy that will be announced by the
o¢ ce-seeking politicians in four di⁄erent political games.
3.1 Parameterization
First, a distribution function for pre-tax income must be chosen. The model can be solved for any
continuous and well-behaved initial income distribution. The speci￿c shape of the distribution function
will however, be an important determinant of the political support for redistribution. Second, the costs
of investing in public and private schooling respectively (i.e., E and P) must be chosen. Third, we must
specify the functions for the return to public and private schooling, i.e., g(yi) and h(yi).
To approximate this, we assume pre-tax income to be Weibull distributed with parameters (b = 100;c = 1:4),
which generates a Gini Coe¢ cient of 0.39.20
20The average market (pre-tax) income Gini is 0.39 according to data from the Luxembourg Income Study (based on
11The ￿xed cost of investing in public and private schooling may respectively be expressed as shares of
the average income:
E = ￿Y; P = ’E ￿;’ 2 R+; ’ > 1: (8)
In the benchmark calibration, we set ￿ = 0:5 and ’ = 2:8, but again, we solve for equilibria over a
wide range of values.21 The return to public and private shooling ￿nally, are set to h(yi) = E + ￿yi
and g (yi) = P + ￿yi, with ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 3. Note that the exact functional forms of these functions
are not important for the political outcomes locally, since neither y￿;y￿￿ or b y depend on these functions.
However, they do enter the utility functions and will therefore play a role in the comparisons between
alternatives where individuals choose di⁄erent (or no) schooling between the respective policies being
compared. Hence, they a⁄ect the global equilibrium as well as the stability regions.
3.2 The Aggregate Support for Changing the Policy
Given the chosen parameters we are now ready to construct the function H(￿), which shows how the
aggregate support for a local increase of the tax rate varies with the tax rate. This is illustrated in
Figure 2. Recall that that at any point where H(￿) is above the 0.5-line, there is a majority (more than
50 percent of the population) in favour of a marginal increase of the tax rate, and vice versa for points
below the 0.5-line. Starting from the very left in Figure 2, i.e., at ￿ = 0, we see that only around 43
percent prefers a marginaly higher tax rate to the zero tax rate. As we move to the right, the aggregate
support for a local increase of the tax rate ￿rst increases to 57 percent at the tax rate 11 percent, and
then decreases and reaches a minimum around 37 percent at the tax rate 40 percent and ￿nally increases
again to a maximum at the tax rate 1.
For interior tax rates, only points where H(￿) cuts the 0.5 line from above (reading left to right) are
local equilibria. Since there is only one such point - at the tax rate ￿ = 0:1429 - this is the only interior
local equilibrium. At this point, exactly half the population is in favour of an increase, while the other
half would like a decrease. In addition, the tax rate ￿ = 0:1429 is majority preferred to marginal changes








, where y > 0;b > 0 and c > 0. The parameter b is just a scale parameter, and c is a shape parameter
determining the degree of inequality.
21A discussion of the benchmark calibration can be found in the Appendix.
12(￿￿) in the tax rate. There are also two tax rates for which H(￿) cuts the 0.5 line from below, i.e., at
￿ = 0:05 and ￿ = 0:49. It is important to note that these tax rates never constitute local equilibria. In
fact, they are both defeated by both their neighbours, implying that they are locally unstable in both
directions. Note ￿nally that both corners also are local equilibria, since a majority of the population is
against a local increase at ￿ = 0, while a majority of the population is in favour of an increase at ￿ = 1.
Hence, to sum up, there are three local equilibria, at ￿ = 0;￿ = 0:1429 and at ￿ = 1, and from Lemma 1
it immedeately follows these are also the only candidates for being the global equilibrium, since no other
tax rate is even a local equilibrium.22









Figure 2: The Aggregate Support for a Marginal Increase in the Tax Rate
Looking at the division of the population at each local equilibrium, as shown in Figure 3, is illustrative
of what drives the support for change in di⁄erent regions of the tax rate. The top panel shows the
intuitively clear division at ￿ = 0: First, there is a group at the lower end of the distribution (those with
y 2 [0;y￿]) characterized by individuals so poor that they can not a⁄ord education at this point. They
have nothing to gain from a marginal change in the subsidy which they do not get and consequently they
22Recall that there are no disincentive e⁄ects from taxation in the model. Hence, in a purely redistributive setting as
long as the median is poorer than the mean there will always be a majority in favor of more redistribution (given that
everyone participates and gets the subsidy). Introducing e⁄ects which bound the maximum away from one does not change
the qualitative results.
13oppose marginal increases of the tax rate (again, note that the wight of those who shift between groups
as a consequence of a marginal change is zero). The second group (those with y 2 [y￿; b y]) consists of
individuals who at this point gains from increased taxes as they get a subsidy which is larger than their
tax payment, while the third group are those at the top of the distribution who, at this point, pay more
than they get and consequently oppose a tax increase. (This third group consists of those who attend
private school and therefore get no subsidy as well as those who attend public school and receive a subsidy
but pay more than they get). The middle panel shows how the composition has gradually changed as we
have moved to a higher tax rate. It is still a coalision between the poorest and the rich who at this local
equilibrium oppose a marginal increase of the tax rate, but the share at the lower end is now smaller
than before as more individuals at this tax level can a⁄ord education thanks to the subsidy. Finally, the
bottom panel shows the division at ￿ = 1 where everyone receives the subsidy and the situation is one
where everyone with an endowment below the mean wants to maximize redistribution.
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Figure 3: Political Compositions that Favor a Marginal Increase in the Tax Rate
Fig. 2 and 3 are both silent about which (if any) of the three equilibria that is the global equilibrium.
To determine this, we compare the three candidates to (a dense grid of) all other tax rates. Doing this,
we ￿nd the global equilibrium to be ￿ = 1. In this search process, we also get information about exactly
how each local equilibrium compares to all other tax rates. This allows us to create stability regions
14around each local equilibrium. Fig.4 shows the results from such a comparison for ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:1429
with stars indicating policies that defeat the respective local equilibrium in a majority vote. We refer to
the the interval of tax rates without stars as a local equilibriums stability region, since all these tax rates
are defeated by the local equilibrium in a majority vote. The top panel shows that ￿ = 0 is not very
stable since it is defeated by any tax rate higher than 7 percent. However, this is not the case for the
local equilibrium ￿ = 0:1429, which is majority prefered to all tax rates between zero and ￿ = 0:68. As
we will see below, these stability regions might be interesting in a number of situations.




Unstable Regions for the Local Eq. at Tax Rate
0




Unstable Regions for the Local Eq. at Tax Rate
0.1429
Figure 4: Stability Properties for the Local Equilibria
In a standard setting of Downsian competition the global equilibrium is the obvious outcome. There
are, however, plausible modi￿cations of the standard game which lead to situations where this is not
necessarily the case. We therefore introduce the following concept:
De￿nition 1 The stable outcome (or Nash equilibrium) of a majority rule election game is a tax rate
announced by the politicians from which none of them has an incentive do deviate.
In the following section we consider four di⁄erent speci￿cations of the political game that illustrate
how the global equilibrium does not always coincide with the stable outcome, and in particular, why local
equilibria - depending on the stability regions - are likely to be the stable outcome.
154 Political Games
4.1 Standard Downsian competition
As a ￿rst benchmark we consider the setting where two parties chose a tax rate as their platform and the
party which gets the majority of the votes wins the election. In this case the relevant political equilibrium
is the majority voting equilibrium and the policy outcome will be the ￿Condorcet winner￿ . In terms of the
method above the H(￿)-function provides information on which tax rates that are local equilibria (and
hence candidates for being the global equilibrium). Since we assume that there are no cost associated
either with campaigning or changing the policy, both parties will, in the example above, announce the
tax rate ￿ = 1 as their platform. Hence, the stable outcome is the global equilibrium. The local equilibria
are not really interesting in this game, but merley a step on the way to ￿nding the global equilibrium (if
it exists).23
4.2 Myopic political competition
Consider now instead the polar extreme where the candidates for some reason only can alter the policy in
small steps. Under this assumption the H(￿)-function also reveals the transition path to the equilibrium.
Which of the local equilibra that actually becomes the stable outcome will depend on the initial tax
rate. Fig. 2 shows that if the economy starts out with a tax rate in the interval ￿ = (0:05;0:49), it will
eventually end up at the local equilirium ￿ = 0:1429, whereas if the initial tax rate is below 0.05, it will
converge to the tax rate ￿ = 0. If the initial tax rate is above 0.49 ￿nally, the policy will instead be
pushed toward 1.
It is important to note that in this type of game the restriction on the candidates alternatives is very
strict. Even if one thinks that it is reasonable to limit the politicians possibility to suggest very large
moves from the starting point (at least without incuring any costs) this is not ideally captured. The
marginal conditions behind the H(￿)-function only evaluate each tax rate against "￿changes and can not
in itself say anything about the aggregate preference for a slightly larger (but still small) move. As was
23If there is no global equilibrium the situation is one usually thought of as a case of "policy cycling". Roine (2006)
however presents some arguments for local equilibria in Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner.
16noted in the introduction, this is likely to be the reason for why local equilibria in majority voting games
have been dismissed in the literature.
4.3 Downsian competition with costs of altering the policy
Now consider instead a standard Downsian competition game between two parties starting at some status
quo position, but where we add the reasonable assumption that there are costs involved in shifting policy
(or altering policy platform). The outcome of the game will then typically come to depend on the stability
regions around the local equilibria. The set up depends on what we assume about the costs of moving
and in particular on whether these costs are borne by the candidates or by the voters. We analyse both
cases in turn.
4.3.1 Costs Borne by the Candidates
Consider the following reduced form of the problem facing each candidate at the status quo: If the
candidate sticks to the status quo policy and the other candidate does the same they both have a 50/50
chance of winning. If one candidate moves to a policy which is majority preferred to the status quo and
the other one does not, the candidate that moves wins with certainty but bears a cost, c; of moving.
Finally, if both move (to the same policy) they are back to a situation where both have a 50 percent
chance of winning, but now both of them will have to bear the cost of moving.24 Normalizing the payo⁄
from winning to one, this game has the following normal form:
Move Stay
Move (0:5 ￿ c; 0:5 ￿ c) (1 ￿ c; 0)
Stay (0; 1 ￿ c) (0:5; 0:5)
: (9)
24To illustrate our point we assume a one-shot game where we only consider two possible actions; "Move" (implicitly to
the nearest point which defeats the status quo) or "Stay" (at the status quo). In a full version of the game there are of
course an in￿nite number of possible moves. Some, such as moving to policies which are defeated by the status quo, are
not interesting but others may be. However, as our aim here is to give conditions for when both candidates would chose to
stick to the status quo this simpli￿ed version is su¢ cient.
17Assume now that the economy starts out at a local equilibrium, and that the parties move simultanuously
in a one-shoot game.25 Obviously, if the initial tax rate is ￿ = 1, the economy stays there, but if we
start at any of the other local equilibria the stable outcome clearly depends on the cost. More precisly,
if c < 0:5; moving is a strictly dominant strategy but if instead c > 0:5 staying with the status quo is
optimal (with obvious indi⁄erence at c = 0:5): If we, which we think is realistic, assume that the cost
of moving is increasing in the distance moved, this implies a negative relation between the size of the
stability region and the "cost per unit moved" needed to make a local equilibrium the stable outcome of
the game.26 In other words, the broader is the stability region, the further the parties must move from
the status quo to get a majority of the votes. Since this is increasingly costly, the more likely it is that
the local equilibrium becomes stable. To see this explicitly, assume that the candidates face the following
simple cost function when moving
c(￿￿) = ￿￿￿; (10)
where ￿￿ is the Euclidian distance between the status quo policy and the policy the candidate is moving
to. If we now compare the two local equilibria ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:1429, the marginal cost needed to
make each of them the stable outcome is more than 8 times higher for the zero tax equilibrium than the
equilibrium with ￿ = 0:1429.27 This is expected since the former eqilibrium has a very short stability
region, whereas the latter already without costs defeats more than 2/3 of all tax rates. Note that the tax
rate ￿ = 1 is still the global equilibrium, but that the stable outcome of the game can di⁄er from that,
depending on the starting point and the cost of altering the platform. This simple example illustrates
that the relevance of a local equilibrium policy as a plausible outcome depends crucially on precisly how
locally stable it is.
25For simplicity, we assume that the starting point is a local equilibrium. This is, however, not very restrictive since
a policy which is not a local equilibrium can be defeted by an in￿nitesimally small move (which, if costs are related to
distance moved, has a very low c): In fact, if we only require the cost of moving to be an increasing continous function c of
the distance moved (￿￿) such that c(0) = 0; fstay;stayg can never be the equilibrium.
26An example of a reason for why large moves should be more costly is that it is likely to be more costly for parties to
communicate major changes in their programs compared to small ones.
27The total cost is not really interesting since payo⁄s have been normalized.
184.3.2 Transition costs borne by the voters
Finally, we consider the case where transition costs are incurred by the citizens.28 Speci￿cally, assume
that the transition cost function is still given by (10), but that the cost of moving just a marginal unit
is zero (i.e., c(￿) = 0) and that the transition is ￿nanced with a tax on the income in period 2. These
assumptions are su¢ cient to make sure that the H (￿)-function in Fig. 3 remains unchanged.29 Voters
face the exact same problem locally, but the comparison of the equilibria to all other tax rates is di⁄erent,
due to the transition costs.
As in the previous section, if the economy starts out with a tax rate ￿ = 1, it stays there and the
stable outcome is ￿ = 1. If, however, the economy starts out with any other tax rate, the stable outcome
could again di⁄er from ￿ = 1. It is of course possible to consider a number of di⁄erent games but what we
are interested in here is to illustrate the relation between the stability region and the transition cost. In
particular, we ask the following question: given that the economy starts out in a local equilibrium (that
is not also the global equilibrium, how large must the transition cost be for this to be the stable outcome.
Furthermore, we want to get a sense of whether the order of magnitude of the cost is such that this is
a realistic case. With knowledge of the stability regions we can calculate the minimum cost required to
make the respective local equilibria stable. We can then express these as fractions of total income to get
a sense of their size. The results for such an exercise in the above benchmark problem are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1: Transition Cost Needed to Make the Local Equilibrium Stable
LOCAL EQUILIBRIUM ￿ = 0 ￿ = 0:1429
Min. Transition Cost for Stability (% of Tot. Inc.) 17:64% 2:2%
Consequently, if the economy starts out at the local equilibrium of ￿ = 0:1429 and the total cost of
moving to a majority prefered policy is larger than 2.2 percent of total income, the status quo remains
28These might be administration costs, or simply costs associated with expanding the system.
29This assumption can easily be relaxed. If there was a positive cost for a marginal move this would simply shift the H (￿)-
function as there would be an additional cost (which would be a ￿xed number for the "￿sized move) to every individuals
utility function. It is also straightforward to show that the tax rate needed to ￿nance the transition is ￿t = ￿￿￿=Y:
19the stable outcome.30 However, if the initial tax rate is ￿ = 0, the total transition cost needed to make
it the stable outcome is more than 17.64 percent of GDP. These results are similar to the previous case
in the sense that transition costs must be seven times higher to make the zero-tax equilibrium stable
compared to the interior equilibrium (￿ = 0:1429): Also the general point is again that relatively small
transition costs may be su¢ cient to make a local equilibrium, with a broad stability region around it,
the stable outcome.
5 Changing the parameters
Having established the potential importence of, not just the global equilibrium tax rate, but also the
local equilibria and their respective stability regions we now move on to study how the possible outcomes
depend on the parameters. More precisely, we will illustrate how the outcomes change over ranges of
di⁄erent starting values of one parameter at a time, keeping the others at their benchmark values from
above.
5.1 The cost of public schooling
Fig. 5 shows the di⁄erent equilibria and their stability regions as we change the cost of public education
(expressed as a fraction of total income and keeping the cost of private schooling ￿xed at the benchmark
level).
In the considered range of public schooling costs, the high tax rate equilibrium is the global equilib-
rium. However, as the cost of public schooling goes up, the share of the population at the bottom of the
distribution who cannot a⁄ord it grows. At some point they are able to form a locally stable coalition
with the rich for a low interior tax rate. Increasing the tax rate further also inroduces zero as a local
equilibrium.31 The stability regions around these respective local equilibria increases as the cost of public
30It is of course possible to be more general and compute the transition cost needed to make ￿ = 0:1429 the stable
outcome given that the economy starts out without any public subsidies to schooling.
31At ￿rst glance the graph may look contradictory as the interior tax rate is stable inside the zero tax rate￿ s region of
stability. However, this is perfectly possible as the starting point for the comparision is each local equilibrium respectively.
In the region where the interior equilibrium is inside the zero tax rate￿ s stability region, there are points which are defeated
by both the zero and the interior local equilibria depending on where we start. However, by de￿nition, the zero tax rate
would defeat the interior local equilibrium in this region. This can also be seen by the fact that when the local equilibrium
interior tax rate crosses the border of the zero tax rate￿ s stability region, the interior is no longer stable agains zero (it￿ s
stability region starts moving up from zero).
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Figure 5: Local Equilibria and Stability Regions as Functions of the Cost of Schooling
schooling goes up. Since the minimum subsidy needed for the poor to bene￿t goes up as public schooling
becomes more expensive, only a large enough subsidy will enable the population at the bottom of the
distribution to participate and bene￿t. The implication of this in terms of political change is that the
policy must jump from zero to a higher level of taxation/redistribution for there to be a majority in favor
of such a policy. Attempts to suggest moderate increases would be defeated by the zero tax rate. We
can also note that the stability region for the zero tax equilibrium seems to increase in the cost, and at
some point (outsider the graph) it becomes the global equilibrium. This will indeed happen at the point
where the cost of public schooling exceeds the return to public schooling.
These ￿ndings are interesting in light of the discussion in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), p. 260,
where it is conjectured that rich individuals would support increasing the "height" of the barrier to
education. Figure 5 illustrates precisely how the stability region of the zero tax equilibrium increases as
the barrier to education goes up. A related interpretation of the above lies in the comparison between
rich and poor countries (rich and poor in the sense that the cost of public schooling is a smaller or larger
share of the average income). Our results suggest that even in a setting where this kind of redistributive
21system is majority preferred (globally), it is less likely that the country would end up with this system the
poorer is the country. Furthermore, if change is to take place this must be drastic rather than gradual.
These conclusions could not be reached in a setting where the focus was on the global equilibrium only.
The only thing that could happen in such an environment is that the global equilibrium jumps from one
to zero at the point where a majority of the population no longer ￿nds it a⁄ordable to educate themselves
at any level of taxation.
5.2 Changing the initial distribution
Another obvious question is how the results change with initial income inequality. To illustrate the most
important e⁄ects, the two panels in Fig. 6 shows a replication of Fig. 5 above, with the di⁄erence that
the initial distribution to the left has a Gini coe¢ cient of 0.3 (i.e. a more equal distribution) and the
panel to the right has a Gini coe¢ cient of 0.5 (that is, a more unequal distribution compared to the
￿gure above). Starting ￿rst with comparing the possibility of a zero tax outcome, it seems that the lower
the Gini is, the less likely is a situation where a majoriy favors no system at all. The reason for this
is that increasing inequality puts more weight on both ends of the distribution thereby increasing the
likelyhood of a ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. This e⁄ect goes in the opposite direction compared
to the standard e⁄ect of increasing inequality leading to higher demand for redistribution because in the
setting considered here being poor potentially means not having access to the redistributive system at
all.
There also seems to be an e⁄ect making the low interior equilibrium more likely when the initial
distribution is more even. This e⁄ect is due to a larger share of the population being part of the middle-
class in favour of some redistribution toward public schooling. Together these e⁄ects illustrate the general
insight that an uneven initial distribution increases the likelyhood of an extreme outcome. Either in the
form of a collapse toward complete redistribution as soon as schooling becomes a⁄ordable for the poor, or
a collapse toward no redistribution at all when schooling is too expensive unless the redistributive system
is su¢ ciently large. When the initial distribution is more even, this gradual move between the extremes
involves a range of schooling costs where the middle-class - which in this case is a larger fraction of the
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Figure 6: Local Equilibria and Stability Regions for Di⁄erent Initial Distributions
population - gains the most from limited redistribution, leading to a majority favoring an interior tax
rate.
Our results con￿rm the ￿nding in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) that an ends-against-the-middle
equilibrium, where the poor are excluded, is more likely the higher is the initial income inequality even
if we consider a continuous distribution. Furthermore, our way of studying the problem allows us to see
how this changes the stability regions of the local equilibria. Such aspects are of course not considered
in a setting such as theirs where only the global equilibrium is considered, but nevertheless these results
are qualitatively in line with the mechanisms suggested in their paper.
6 Concluding discussion
The model of voting over education subsidies is an example of a reoccuring type of problem in public
economics. The common feature is that individuals shift between participating and not participating in
some redistributive scheme as the policy changes, which in turn typically lead to di¢ culties when trying
to determine the political support for redistribution. Often - as in the above - the problem involves an
investment of some kind which is partially subsidiesed but paid for by a universal tax, and where poor
23individuals can not (or choose not to) invest if the subsidy is too small. However, similar problems may
also arise when studying consumption problems where a good is not consumed at all by poor individuals
unless it is su¢ ciently subsidiezed ("culture goods" are the standard example).32 Furthermore, even
though it is most common that the exclusion happens for the poor and on the side of receiving the
subsidy, it is also possible to envision situations where individuals "exit" the system on the side of paying
the tax (while still recieving subsidies).33
If one insits that there is only one possible majority rule equilibrium in this type of problem (if an
equilibrium exists) the method exempli￿ed above can solve the problem in the sense that it ￿nds the
global equilibrium tax rate (the Condorcet-winner).34 However, if one is prepared to consider settings
where, for example, there are costs involved in shifting the policy, the stability regions around the local
equilibria introduces the possibility to consider outcomes in between local and global equilibria.35
Considering ￿rst what we have learnt about the speci￿c problem of majority decisions over education
subsidies it is illustarative to, once again, compare our results with the insights from Fernandez and
Rogerson (1995), who study essentially the same problem as the one above. They reach three main
conclusions: First, they show that there can be equilibria where transfers go from lower income groups to
higher income groups (that is the case when the poor are e⁄ectively excluded from the bene￿ts). Second,
they ￿nd that this kind of situation becomes more likely the higher is the initial inequality of income, and
third, they show that wealthier individuals may gain from higher costs of education as this may enable
them to exclude poorer individuals from the redistributive system. Our analysis of the problem come to
the same conclusions. However, our way of studying the problem introduces additional insights, which
also have implications for this type of problem more generally.
First, we show that when introducing costs of altering the status quo policy in the political game, the
possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Depending on the starting point (or on small initial di⁄erences) the
stable outcome can be very di⁄erent even if the situation is such that there is only one global equilibrium.
32Subsidized "culture consumption" is indeed the lead example in Austen-Smith (2003) which studies majority preferences
for subsidies rather than direct income distribution.
33Roine (2006a) is an example where ￿x-cost investments in tax avoidance can cause violations of conditions required for
the median voter theorems to hold. In this paper the rich and the poor may in equilibrium favor increased redistribution.
34This is in it self important as the alternative has previously been to simplyfy the problem in various ways.
35The other obvious way we see to introduce di⁄erences between moves close to the status quo and moves far from it is
informational aspects. These may of course be linked to costs as overcoming information problems can be seen as possible
but costly.
24In terms of the example above, two otherwise equal countries (or regions) could based on, for example,
di⁄erences in the cost of changing the policy end up choosing either a low tax equilibrium with limited
subsidies and a large share of the population excluded from education (an outcome which is not a global
equilibrium but which may never the less be stable), or a high tax equilibrium with full subsidies and
everyone attending school. Similar situations can be envisioned for countries with di⁄erent initial income
distribution, starting at di⁄erent status quo policies, or with di⁄erent entry barriers for participating. In
all these cases it is worth noting that the way in which the stability regions around local equilibria change
correspond to the basic insights above. As inequality increases, or the entry barriers become higher, the
stability region around a low tax equilibrium increases making such an outcome more likely. However, we
can also see ￿ner aspects of the problem such as the incresed possibility of an interior low tax equilibrium
for a more equal initial distributions, and increased likelyhood of extreame outcomes when the initial
inequality is greater. These changes happen in a range where a tax rate of one is the global equilibrium
and hence the only considered outcome in previous work.
Second, our way of studying the problem also illustrates that policy can not always be shifted gradually.
If a redistributive system where exclusion may happen is to be introduced it is possible that it must
immediately have some minimum size. If it does not, there can be a majority who preferres the zero tax
rate since too many of the poor would oppose the introduction. Similarily shifting from a situation where
the system is small in scope to a higer tax-transfer state may also only be possible through a very large
shift as all intermediate states would be defeated by the smaller system in a pair-wise competition. It is
worth noting that in our example above the stability region of the low tax rate had a range of up to over
50 percentage points which would represent a major shift.
Third, the method gives a "continuous picture" of political support for di⁄erent policies ranging from
local to global equilibrium. The aggregation of the support for marginal (local) change over the policy
space gives a map of the direction in which the policy would move starting at any point. The stability
regions around each local equilibrium indicates precisely how far policy would have to move for change to
be majority preferred, and ￿nally, the last step in the procedure ￿nds the global equilibrium (if it exists).
We belive that this, besides solving for the global equilibrium outcome, gives a richer understanding of
25the possibilities of political change.
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A Appendix
B Proof of continuity of y￿(￿);y￿￿(￿) and b y(￿).
As the tax rate changes so does the support for additional changes. Given the assumption that ￿ = 0; the
function which traces the aggregate support for a marginal increase of the tax rate is bounded downwards
by y￿; that is, the threshold at which individuals choose public schooling instead of no schooling, and
uppwards by y￿￿; the threshold at which individuals instead choose private school.
H(￿) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
0 if b y < y￿
Z b y
y￿




f(y)dy if b y > y￿
The applicability of the function which traces the aggregate support for a marginal increase of the
tax rate for ￿nding tax rates depends crucially on the continuity of the function. Our claim is that the
above integral constitute the fraction of the population which would vote in favor of a suggested marginal
increase. As the limits are themselves functions of the tax rate, this is only true if
lim
￿!0
y￿ (￿) = y￿ (￿ + ￿)
lim
￿!0
b y (￿) = b y (￿ + ￿)
lim
￿!0
y￿￿ (￿) = y￿￿ (￿ + ￿)





0 if E ￿ s
E￿s(￿)
1￿￿ if E > s
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1￿￿ = 0, y￿ is continuous in ￿ if s is continuous in ￿. The proof hence concernes the
properties of s.
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are continuous in ￿.





1￿￿ ) we can use the following implicit function theorem in the following way:
Consider the implicit function
￿(x;￿) ￿ ￿Y = 0;












By the Implicit Function Theorem, if the derivative @￿
@x (with ￿ ￿xed) is a bijection there exists a unique
continously di⁄erentiable function s; such that s(￿) = x. This solution is also locally unique.
We know that @￿
@x is a bijection if @￿






















36Note that if E ￿ s, everybody is investing in schooling so y￿ = ￿(y￿) = 0.
30it is indeed a bijection. This means there consists a continously di⁄erentiable function s(￿) which for
every ￿ has a unique solution s(￿) = x which solves ￿(x;￿)￿￿Y = 0: In our setting, hence, for every tax
rate ￿ there exists a continously di⁄erentiable function s(￿) which uniquely determines a subsidy that















1￿￿ ) = ￿Y
F(
P
1￿￿) so there are no discontinuities at the point E =
s. Hence, s is continuous in ￿, 8￿ 2 [0;1). It then immediately follows that y￿ is continuous in ￿,
implying that lim
￿!0
y￿ (￿) = y￿ (￿ + ￿), which completes the ￿rst part of the proof. Consider now b y = @s
@￿ .
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again implying that there are no discontinuities at E = s, that b y is continuous in ￿ and consequently
that lim
￿!0
b y (￿) = b y (￿ + ￿).
B.1 Proof of Proposition XX
Proof. The proof concerns the case E > s, since existence is obvious whenever E ￿ s. Since P > E,









and is thus bounded. From continuity and
the intermediate value theorem, s then has a ￿xed point in this interval.
31C The Benchmark Calibration
To calibrate ￿ in (10),￿we note that the ￿xed cost of investing in public schooling E may be decomposed
into direct and indirect costs associated with schooling. Direct costs includes tuition and non-tuition
spending, such as other school fees, textbooks, supplementary study guides, uniforms, writing supplies,
transportation etc. Indirect costs on the other hand, include the value of lost labor income, as well as the
economic value of all the unpaid work related to schooling, that parents and community members may
carry out.37
The direct costs for schooling may be very large. Bray (1999) report for instance that household
expenditure on primary (public) education per child in Cambodia is up to 20 percent of the household
income. In addition to these direct costs, there are other large costs associated with schooling that are
met by community ￿nancing and government subsidies. Bray argues that the situation is similar for a
number of other developing countries. Taking this as a benchmark of what the direct cost of schooling
would be to the household in the absence of donations and subsidies, we set the direct cost of schooling
to be 25 percent of average income.
To this direct cost, the indirect cost of schooling, i.e., the economic value of foregone opportunities
of schooling must be added. There do not really seem to exist any available studies quantifying the
total indirect cost of schooling. Bray (1999) report the value of lost labor income of attaining primary
education in Cambodia to be of almost the same magnitude as the direct cost. In a broad sense, we are
considering both primary and secondary education and the value of labor generally gets larger as agents
get older. Moreover, to the value of lost labor income, the value of all unpaid work related to schooling
carried out by parents and community members should be added. Taking this into account and lacking
other estimates, we set the indirect cost to be as large as the direct cost, generating a total ￿xed cost of
investing in public schooling of 50 percent of average income, i.e., ￿ = 0:5.
Now consider the parameter ’. Unfortunately, there are not many available studies on relative costs in
private and public schools. One exception is Tsang (2002), who compares the costs of public and private
37For example the time parents spend on helping their kids with homework and transportation to school related activities.
Parents and community members may also be asked to provide labor and/or materials for construction and maintenance
of the school.
32schools in developing countries. He report that the direct private cost, i.e., the cost that households have
to pay up front to be allowed to enrol the school, is between 1.83 and 8.02, times higher for private than
for public schools. Lacking other estimates, we set ’ = 2:6.
Finally, we need to specify the returns to schooling. We have assumed that the return to private
schooling is higher than the return to public schooling, i.e., that h(yi) > g (yi); 8yi. In our calibration,
we set the returns to E + ￿yi and P + ￿yi for public and private schooling respectively, with ￿ > ￿ > 1:
Note that the exact functional forms of these functions are not important for the political outcomes locally,
since neither y￿;y￿￿ or b y depend upon these functions. However, they do enter the utility functions and
will therefore play a role in the comparisons between alternatives where individuals choose di⁄erent (or
no) schooling between the respective policies being compared.
The empirical evidence supporting the assumption that agents from private schools would perform
better than agents from public schools is somewhat weak, but the assumption at least seem to have some
empirical support (Rouse, 1998 and Long, 2004).38
D Numerical Computation of the Equilibrium
1. Set up a grid for policy [￿1;:::;￿J].
2. At each grid point solve for y￿




j f (y)dy; j = 1;:::;J
3. Approximate the functions y￿ (￿);s(￿) and N (￿). We use cubic splines
4. At each grid point, compute b yj = ds(￿j)d￿, and Hj =
R b yj
y￿
j f (y)dy; j = 1;:::;J
5. Approximate the functions b y (￿) and H (￿). Again, we use cubic splines
6. Find all equilibria, i.e., ￿nd H (￿) = 0:5 and cuts the 0.5 line from above. Also check corners.
7. Compare these candidates to a dense grid of all other tax rates and report the result.
38Generally there is a substantial selection problem involved when trying to estimate the relative return to private and
public schooling.
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